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Everyday explanations of behavior that one 
way or another appeal to emotions are ubiq-
uitous and there appear almost always to be 
three components to them. First, there is a 
reference to some significant event in the 
environment or in the person (a source of 
danger in the environment or the sight of 
an angry person). The second component 
refers to the effects in the mind, brain, and 
body of the person to whom we attribute 
an emotion or who attributes an emotion 
to himself. Typical examples of a change of 
mind are a sudden state of fear or disgust, 
or physiological changes like in breathing 
rhythm, feelings of excitement and changes 
in behavior like running and a number of 
actions. The third component consists in ref-
erence to the goal of the events. This involves 
typically a statement of what is good or bad 
for the organism, how the events that trigger 
emotions appear to contribute significantly, 
positively, or negatively, to somebody’s 
overall life goals. These three components, 
separately or in various combinations, are 
the pillars of our everyday language of emo-
tions. Is the science of emotion wedded to 
this language and the worldview it embod-
ies? If not, it may be easier to develop new 
scientific emotion theories, but the price to 
pay is a disconnection from subjective expe-
rience. Emotion science may be in a unique 
position in that subjective experience is part 
and parcel of its subject matter.
For many decades mainstream science 
has been prejudiced against the possibility 
of a serious, respectable scientific study of 
emotions. Much as we all pay lip service to 
an evolutionary perspective on mind, brain, 
and behavior, many of us still somehow 
exclude emotions from this evolutionary 
objectivism. Emotions seem somehow too 
dense with daily psychological reality to 
promise solid scientific insights. To some 
extent this situation is related to the vague-
ness of the core notions used in affective 
science. For example, it is often unclear 
what the difference is between terms like 
emotions, feelings, affect, subjective expe-
rience, and other related ones (Russell and 
Feldman Barrett, 1999). Researchers outside 
the field of emotion sometimes blame the 
confusion surrounding the concept of emo-
tion for this state of affairs. The concept of 
emotion is ill defined and there is the feel-
ing both inside and outside the community 
that the first issue on the agenda should be 
to craft a definition of what emotions are 
(Kleinginna and Kleinginna, 1981). But this 
is most probably an illusion. One hardly 
needs to glance at the situation in other dis-
ciplines to see that notions like nature, envi-
ronment etc., are equally open-ended and 
that this does not hinder scientific research. 
The history of science shows that definitions 
are the result rather that the beginning of 
scientific theories.
From the very beginning of scientific 
psychology with Wundt (1897) and of emo-
tion theory with Darwin (1872) and James 
(1890) two different ways of thinking about 
emotions have been around. Wundt paid 
attention to the phenomenal experience 
using quantitative and qualitative descrip-
tors that hold across all emotions. Darwin 
instead concentrated on the discrete muscle 
patterns associated with some of the major 
emotions, while James focused on the causal 
relation between bodily changes and emo-
tional feelings. So, from the very beginning 
emotion theories were addressing two very 
different sides of the same coin. At present, 
the gap between movement patterns and 
phenomenal experience remains as theo-
retically important and as hard to bridge 
as it was a hundred years ago. As a matter 
of fact, with the advent of an increasingly 
broad array of new measuring tools the gap 
has opened wider and wider. More layers 
than ever imagined now become visible 
but the task of relating the different strata 
to each other has become more daunting 
than ever.
We would like to mark the launch of 
Frontiers in Emotion Science by looking for-
ward and formulate a few landmark ques-
tions including some that have not attracted 
much attention so far: How many emotions 
are there, are all emotions alike, what is there 
to measure, how do we measure emotions, 
what does interdisciplinarity mean, how 
important is interaction, what are the issues 
for modeling emotions, what is the part of 
context, do feelings matter, consciousness, 
and emotions.
How many emotions are tHere? 
How do we count emotions?
A question that intrigues the layman and 
plagues scientists is how many emotions 
there really are. Are fears and panic the same 
emotion, different only in intensity? Social 
anxiety hinge on the same basis as spider 
phobia, only differing in object? Are embar-
rassment and guilt the same, again only dif-
ferent in intensity? Is empathy an emotion? 
As soon as we begin to answer such ques-
tions we get boggled down in linguistic and 
terminological nightmares. Older schools of 
philosophical psychologists as we find them, 
e.g., in Germany in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth century, have provided elaborate clas-
sifications. More empirically minded authors 
have from the beginning been torn between 
so called dimensional accounts, organizing 
the variety of emotional states along differ-
ent continua or in discrete categories possibly 
structured as the basic vs. the extended emo-
tion system (Davidson, 1995). A dimensional 
account that is seemingly the best supported 
in recent reach consists of two dimensions, 
“arousal” (or intensity) and “valence” (posi-
tive or negative, pleasing or unpleasant 
(Plutchik, 1980). Other authors used differ-
ent labels for the two dimensions and contrast 
approach and withdrawal (Davidson, 1995) 
Simple dimensional contrasts work reason-
ably well for pairing with behavioral measures 
with emotion labels and with physiological 
measures. However, a common critique is 
that it just will not work to map the variety of 
behaviors, experiences and feelings typically 
associated with different emotions, along 
such simple dimensions. The most famous 
spokesperson of a discrete counting method 
for emotions is Ekman (1999). His view is 
associated with that of six basic emotions, 
which are happiness, surprise, fear, anger, 
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A more evolutionarily plausible approach 
to emotions puts the adaptive dimension 
of emotions on the forefront and empha-
sizes the close relationship between emo-
tion and action (Panksepp, 1998; de Gelder, 
2006; Frijda, 2007; Tamietto and de Gelder, 
2010). The study of affective processes is by 
necessity interdisciplinary and this is cen-
tral goal of the burgeoning field of affective 
neurosciences. At present, agreeing on an a 
priori definition of emotion than by draft-
ing an innovative and theoretically well-
founded research agenda bringing affective 
neuroscience in line with the biological sci-
ences will no so much provide this. A major 
tasks is to unlock the information contained 
at the different levels at which emotional 
behavior can currently be measured such 
that we begin to understand how the differ-
ent levels of affective existence. Measuring 
affective processing then takes the form 
of building bridges between the levels of 
processing (personal, sub personal, behav-
ioral, physiological, etc) and the measures 
(psychophysics, lesion studies, neurodegen-
erative disorders, brainimaging, etc).
mentalism or biologism?
Clarifying the focus of affective science by 
(re)starting from an evolutionary perspective 
rather than a Cartesian one. A sophisticated 
analysis of emotional behavior must allow 
us to overcome the misleading distinction or 
even the absolute gap between inner mental 
life and outer behavioral and physiological 
manifestations that we measure but whose 
pertinence for the real subjective emotional 
experience we tend to doubt.
multisensory cHaracter of 
affective signaling systems
In human research tradition has favored the 
visual system over the auditory, the auditory 
over the haptic, the haptic over the olfactory. 
There is at present very little research onto 
multisensory emotion signals, although real 
life experience certainly convinces us of the 
importance of taste and smell. For example, 
the amygdala plays a critical role not just 
in processing visual information like fear-
ful facial or bodily expressions but equally 
auditory information like voice prosody. 
This may be viewed as an indication that 
the message is more important than the 
medium and that the functional organiza-
tion of the brain is at least as sensitive to the 
message than to the medium.
Modern emotion researchers have not 
yet clarified the link between emotions and 
a basic repertoire of actions like approach, 
avoidance, search, or fear. For example, 
the question as to whether specific body 
movements are associated with distinct 
emotional states has rarely been addressed 
(de Gelder, 2006; de Gelder et al., 2006). 
This is surprising given that Aristotle, in his 
treatise on Physiognomics, was already con-
vinced that the body as a whole expressed 
emotional states and that facial expressions 
were simply a part of that overt behavior. 
Since the early work of Hess (Hess and 
Brügger, 1943) who observed that electri-
cal stimulation of the tectum and related 
structures induced characteristic postures 
and even behaviors expressing emotions 
Mori in Japan has conducted a systematic 
analysis of the neural basis of some aspects 
of emotional expressions of the whole body 
in the cat (Mori et al., 1999). The important 
contribution of this series of studies is to 
suggest that bodily expressions are pro-
duced by an output of the emotional system 
to brain stem and mesencephalic centers 
triggering behaviors that belong to motor 
repertoire of the animal. A grand excep-
tion is the approach by Frijda (2007). The 
central concept of all his theoretical work 




The general perception is that the most 
urgent task is that of measuring the mind 
at the different levels and with all the differ-
ent methodologies currently available and 
to integrate the results across the different 
methods (behavioral, personality question-
naires, physiology, neurofunctional corre-
lates, genetics, neuropsychology). In the last 
decade emotion research has concentrated 
on brain activity generated by the perception 
of still images of facial expressions and this 
has already produced models of the brain 
network involved in perceiving emotional 
signals typically provide by facial expres-
sions (Haxby et al., 2000; Adolphs, 2002; 
de Gelder et al., 2003) and outlined the 
role of several structures such as the amy-
gdala, orbito-frontal, or cingulate cortex. 
Recent studies broaden the perspective by 
drawing attention to extra-visual areas like 
insula (Craig, 2009), sensory-motor cor-
tex (Adolphs et al., 2000; Sato et al., 2004). 
disgust, and sadness. As noted above, his 
view is that since emotions are evolutionary 
shaped biological properties of the organism, 
they have to be universal within the same spe-
cies. Therefore his motivation was to search 
for such universal emotions and his method 
was to look for facial muscle patterns. An 
underlying assumption is that fixed muscle 
patterns reflect pre-wired mental states with 
characteristic expressions that are in turn 
well characterized by the emotion words we 
use for them. Another example is the theory 
developed by Panksepp (1998). Similar to the 
position taken by LeDoux (1996), Panksepp 
believes that there are a few clear and sepa-
rate emotions and that the best chance for 
scientific progress is to tackle each separately. 
LeDoux argues that fear is in this respect the 
most promising candidate. Panksepp has 
argued for four basic emotional systems (fear, 
seeking, panic, and rage). These are selected 
on the basis of their purported neurobiologi-
cal profile (including characteristic behavior 
as well as neurobiological signatures). The 
point to note is that each of these positions 
is welded to a specific research agenda that has 
proven successful in the past, for addressing 
the questions of the day and using the meth-
ods of the times. But science progresses by 
discovering new questions rather than only 
by answering existing ones.
wHat to measure?
We just discussed the near impossibility 
of quantifying emotions outside any theo-
retical context. A different issue to bring up 
before we look into emotion measurement 
issues properly speaking is what to meas-
ure. By and far, most emotion theories aim 
at measuring emotions and in the process 
just concentrate on one kind of emotional 
signal, mostly the face. In the large majority 
of the studies the face is used as a stimulus 
to trigger an emotional state in the observer 
(de Gelder et al., 2006). The focus of meas-
uring emotions is then the experience trig-
gered by seeing the emotional stimulus. That 
experience is seen as encompassing differ-
ent layers including changes in physiological 
state, states of action readiness, and subjec-
tive experience. Depending on the theory, 
it also includes evaluation of appraisal of 
the emotion triggering event and its initial 
effects on the organism (Scherer, 2009). But 
with the exception of Paul Ekman’s work 
(and to some extent Dimberg’s (1982) the 
facial behavior itself is not measured.
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In recent years, these models have been 
rediscovered and extended by neuroscien-
tists, notably Damasio and colleagues in 
their formulation of the somatic marker 
hypothesis (Damasio, 1994). This idea is 
also present in contemporary perspectives 
on consciousness, including Edelman’s 
theory of neural Darwinism (Tononi and 
Edelman, 1998). New findings on non-
conscious affective perception challenge 
this view and to us indicate that we can-
not treat consciousness as a unitary phe-
nomenon (Tamietto and de Gelder, 2010). 
A distinction is needed between affective 
consciousness and cognitive consciousness. 
Cognitive consciousness is sometimes used 
interchangeably with attention and both 
presume partial or complete visual aware-
ness of the stimulus. The concept of affec-
tive consciousness has a long but different 
history. In part this was due to the fact that 
affective awareness was in the past system-
atically relegated to dubious phenomena 
like gut feelings, hunched, or wordless 
intuitions. Empirical evidence concerning 
the dependence between somatic responses 
and affective experience is at present still 
ambiguous. Do we have immediate explicit 
access to autonomic and somatic activity as 
suggested by William James? It is unclear 
whether internal cues that produce feel-
ings of arousal are perceived without 
being attended to and if so, whether such 
perception is accurate. Bodily sensations 
are rarely experienced consciously or with 
perfect fidelity (Barrett et al., 2007), yet 
they are nonetheless continually detected 
and internally represented and they are the 
basis for subjective experience of affect in 
humans. There is a substantial literature 
on consciousness including by emotion 
researchers yet a lot of it seems to concern 
cognitive awareness of emotions. We may 
need to explore a different approach that 
focuses on affective awareness and feelings 
and different epistemological criteria about 
subjective certainty may then apply here.
In conclusion, pushed forward by the 
newly perceived importance of the field 
and by many novel questions confronting it, 
Frontiers in Emotion Science will broaden 
its scope in the coming decades. Rather that 
figuring as one of the subfields of psycho-
logical science, the issues that Frontiers in 
Emotion Science deals with may increas-
ingly fuel scientific progress in a host of 
other fields.
ception as well as in production. Context, 
phylogenetically as well as ontogenetically 
and context of acquisition of affective 
signal ability are important and so is the 
context of reading the emotional signals. 
Neither has received much attention so far 
by researchers.
Computational modeling of emotional 
processes must reckon with the likelihood 
that the affective mind is distributed over 
different relatively autonomous subsys-
tems (different sensory systems, different 
carriers of affective information within 
the same sensory system, different types 
of processing, e.g., explicit or implicit 
within and across sensory systems; dif-
ferent context of reading affective signals) 
that are only partly coherent and prob-
ably obey principles of local optimization 
of information determined by a host of 
context factors.
interaction makes or brakes 
emotional communication
The long prevailing mentalism loosely 
associated with Descartes (but part of 
any approach of emotions that is build 
on the distinction between emotion and 
cognition), viewed emotions as individual 
subjective mental states. More biologi-
cally oriented analysis will need to reveal 
the interactive nature of expressions. For 
example, in neuropsychology an interest-
ing attempt was made by Ajurriaguera to 
study the postures of tenderness between a 
mother and her child. The originality of his 
approach was to consider body expression 
of emotion as an interactive link between 
two people. This remained an isolated 
theme that is a promising to be explored in 
contemporary research.
emotions and consciousness
The relation between emotion and con-
sciousness is a complicated one. It has long 
been argued that the term non-conscious 
emotions is an oxymoron, the argument 
being that emotions require subjective 
experience hence by definition require 
awareness. For some theorists emotional 
experience follows emotional reflex actions 
while for others it is part of decision-mak-
ing and precedes action. A classical posi-
tion on this is the James–Lange theory 
postulating that our emotional feelings 
and experience follow from awareness of 
our automatic reaction to affective signals. 
tHe medium and tHe message of 
affective signals
Human emotion investigations have con-
centrated on one medium of affective com-
munication, the face. Our current theories 
and insights may reflect this bias and may 
block the view on the emotion message. 
Other channels of communication like 
the whole body and the voice need to be 
part of the scope of emotion theories and 
importantly, of the envisaged applications 
including clinical ones. We do not know at 
present whether deficits or biases in one 
channel also exist in others. For example, 
emotion perception deficits in autism or 
in schizophrenia are reported for facial 
expressions, but less so for bodily expres-
sions, at least in explicit behavioral recog-
nition tasks.
pHylogenetic brain specialization 
and laterality, brain arcHeology, 
and recycling
Cross-species studies are much needed as 
current models of human emotion process-
ing typically are a mix of insights from 
animal research (e.g., about brain areas 
and their connectivity), physiological, and 
behavioral studies for which there is cur-
rently very little evidence in humans. One 
obstacle is the tendency to conflate matters 
of form and matters of function and this 
leads to overgeneralizations without much 
empirical support. Cross species studies are 
difficult though. Human emotion labels do 
not readily apply to animal observations. 
The obstacles are not just terminological. 
Simple words like angry, fear of happy are 
easy to use when human observers classify 
human vocalizations. When we use them, 
we are aware of anthropomorphizing as a 
means what we see and feel to be the case in 
the animal. But still the untrained observer 
is at loss to apply these words to monkey 
vocalizations. It does not help much to look 
for similarities in facial muscle patterns. 
Fear, joy, and anger facial expressions are 
quite different in human or animal displays 
and these are only just the most obvious 
emotion labels.
realism, naturalism, and 
culturalism
Different emotional signing systems (face, 
body, voice) need to be investigated in rela-
tion to their naturalistic context as they 
have intrinsic links with each other, in per-
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